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Abstract 
This current study explores how children use their ability to reason proportionally and attend to 
proportional inequality in social situations. Previous studies have found that adults tend to use 
their knowledge of proportion to evaluate resource allocations. This perception of fairness is 
used to judge social traits.  In addition, non-human primates have been found to react negatively 
when an allocation received was less attractive than an allocation received by a conspecific. In 
this study, children were introduced to two cartoons, each of whom allocated a designated 
proportion of chips to the child and another amount to a perceived competitor to the child. The 
children were then asked to judge which cartoon they would prefer to be friends with. Sensitivity 
to the proportion of resources received compared to the rival would show that the propensity to 
measure a stranger’s resource allocation by using proportion is a behavior enacted by both 
children and adults. It would also provide additional evidence that children are capable of 
attending to ratio and proportion before any formal education in the topic. The study found that 
children performed at chance when selecting which cartoon to be friends with, suggesting that 
children may not attend to the same social cues that adults attend to when judging friend-worthy 
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Most adults would say they often use the perception of fairness to attribute social traits 
onto those that they have interacted with. To do this, they use proportion to decide if a set of 
resources has been distributed fairly.  Previous studies have shown that children’s judgments of 
resource allocations are distinctly different from that of adults. It has been found that young 
children’s perception of fair resource distributions is very self- interested (Damon, 1975; Fehr, 
Bernhard, & Rockenbach, 2008; LoBue, Nishida, Chiong, DeLoache, & Haidt, 2011). Five-year-
old children begin to understand equality and use proportion to determine how fairly a set of 
resources was distributed (McCrink, Bloom, & Santos, 2010). However, this understanding is 
limited to a strict adherence to equal allocation of resources to all members of the allocation, 
regardless of the effort put in by the members. As adults, we use proportion as the predominant 
decision factor to make judgments of allocations in social conditions when there is no effort 
involved in gaining resources (McCrink, et al., 2010; Newman, 1996). Additionally, older 
children and adults begin to think about other factors such as the proportion of resources 
received relative to the individual’s contribution (LoBue, et al., 2011).  
Previous research has suggested that children’s inability to properly reason about the 
distribution of resources is due to their inability to understand ratio and proportion. For example, 
Piaget & Inhelder (1975) presented children with two jars that contained “target and non-target” 
marbles and asked each child which jar had the best chance of yielding a “target marble”. The 
study showed that children under seven could not consistently focus on the denominator of a 
ratio – in other words, the children attended to the absolute value while disregarding the total 
amount of objects. Additionally, it has been found that children’s social development is 
correlated with their mathematical reasoning (Damon, 1975). Damon (1975) suggests that 
children’s ability to progress through Piagetian logical stages greatly parallels their progress 
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through certain levels of moral thinking. Young children tended to confuse their own desires 
with what was fair (Damon, 1975). Thus it was claimed that proper knowledge of certain 
mathematical and social concepts provided a crucial foundation for a child’s proportional 
reasoning.  
 However, other studies have since shown that children possess a rudimentary capability 
to differentiate certain ratios and proportions. Studies have even established that an innate sense 
of ratio exists in infants. Six-month-old infants are able to successfully discriminate quantities 
that differed by a ratio of two (McCrink & Wynn, 2007). Additionally, others have claimed 
children’s poor performance in Piaget & Inhelder’s (1975) study occurred simply because they 
were not interested in the stimuli they were asked to attend to. In another study, children in two 
separate conditions were told they would receive a “prize” -- either a toy or a button – if they 
picked a chip of a certain color from one of two boxes (Yost, Siegel, & Andrews, 1962). Those 
children expecting to receive a toy were able to choose the box with a higher likelihood of 
yielding the target chip at a significantly higher rate than those who were to receive a button. In 
other words, high reinforcement children (those that were told they were to receive a toy), were 
able to maximize the probability of being rewarded by attending to proportion.  Contrary to 
Piaget & Inhelder’s (1975) claims, five-year-old children showed a significant sensitivity to both 
numerator and denominator when given an incentive to do so (Yost, et al., 1962). Following on 
the Yost et al.’s (1962) study, Denison & Xu (2010) revealed that twelve to 14-month-old infants 
were able to judge proportionality in the same way with large set sizes of lollipops.  
 If children are innately capable of attending to proportion, then they should, much like 
adults do, be able to use proportion as a way to reason about resource distribution and to measure 
fairness during social situations. In a recent study, McCrink, et al. (2010) explored how children 
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and adults use their understanding of proportion in a social context, specifically when they are 
making judgments of niceness. Children and adults were presented with two characters – a 
puppet with twelve chips and a puppet with four chips. The children were told that the chips they 
were given could be exchanged for a toy from the toy store. Thus, the children were given the 
proper incentive to attend to the amount of chips designated, but did have a specific amount in 
mind. The amount of chips each puppet gave to the child was manipulated on a proportional or 
absolute dimension – proportionally equal (2/4 versus 6/12), absolutely equal (3/4 versus 3/12), 
and conflict of both dimensions (3/4 versus 6/12). For example, in a proportionally equal 
condition, one puppet would give the participant two out of four chips while the second puppet 
would relinquish six of his twelve chips. After each interaction, the child or adult was asked 
which character was nicer. The study found that four-year-olds tended to focus on absolute 
amount when asked who was nicer. On the contrary, adults focused primarily on proportion 
when asked which puppet was nicer. It was found that five-year-olds began to show some 
sensitivity to proportion, as they favored the puppet that gave away a higher proportion of chips 
more often than four-year-olds did in the absolutely equal trials (3/4 versus 3/12). Thus, it was 
suggested that five-year-olds had the capabilities of focusing on proportion. Because adults 
primarily focused on proportion, they found the proportionally equal (2/4 versus 6/12) trial the 
hardest trial to judge who was nicer. This study challenges previous assumptions that both four 
and five-year-olds are self- interested or strict egalitarians when it comes to resource 
distributions. Additionally, it implies that young children are capable of using proportion in 
social situations. What does this finding say about children’s ability to attend to ratio and 
proportion? Five-year-olds, much like four-year-olds, are typically not exposed to the topics of 
proportion or ratio in formal education – what is bringing this sudden change? Perhaps it is 
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linked to a child’s increasing ability to engage in adult- like social behavior. On the other hand, 
perhaps four-year-olds are capable of attending to proportion, but need additional social 
incentives to do so. 
 McCrink, et al.’s  (2010) study raises a question: Why, if children are innately capable of 
understanding proportion and ratio, do they typically attend to absolute values when judging 
resource allocations? Perhaps it is simply because they do not recognize the amounts of chips 
remaining, and their attention must be brought to it. In a subsequent study, two new types of 
trials were included – “enhanced” and “non-enhanced” (McCrink & Lin, unpublished). In the 
enhanced trial, an attempt was made to bring the remaining amount of chips each character had 
left to the child’s attention, so as to make each child more aware of the proportion of chips given.  
In the “non-enhanced” trial, no attempt was made to bring the child’s attention to the remaining 
amount of chips. In addition, an archetypal theory-of-mind task was incorporated – a false belief 
task – to test any parallels that may exist between theory-of-mind capabilities and social 
judgment. However, no direct correlations were found between theory-of-mind passers and 
children who were sensitive to proportion during social judgments. Additionally, bringing 
attention to the amount of chips left over did not have an overall effect on how the child 
perceived the niceness of the puppet character. Thus, it remained unclear whether four-year-olds 
were interested in using proportion as a cue to a fair resource distribution.  
One possibility is that it takes a competitive social context in order to prompt children to 
reason about proportion when making social judgments in the same way adults do.  A new 
hypothesis was created in order to parallel individuals’ tendencies to compare their own pay-offs 
to others after an allocation of resources (Brosnan & de Waal, 2003). Humans across cultures 
attend to fairness, and respond negatively when treated disadvantageously or undercompensated 
Proportional Inequality and Children 7 
relative to other individuals (Brosnan, 2006).  Brosnan & de Waal’s (2003) study found that this 
behavior was not uniquely human, as non-human primates were averse to disadvantageous 
inequality as well. The researchers found that capuchin monkeys respond negatively when they 
received a disadvantageous resource distribution compared to a conspecific. Capuchin monkeys 
were trained to trade a token with a human experimenter in exchange for a reward. Monkeys 
who witnessed a conspecific receive a more attractive reward (grapes compared to their 
cucumber) refused to participate. Brosnan & de Waal (2003) also noted that these monkeys 
accepted their reward of cucumbers when there was no more attractive reward  available for 
comparison. Additionally, the capuchin monkeys accepted the cucumber even if the more 
desirable food was within sight, but not given to any other monkey. The same observations were 
found with chimpanzees as well (Brosnan, 2006).Since this behavior is regarded as evolutionary 
and instinctual in non-human primates such as chimpanzees, the current study aimed to explore 
whether or not children use their innate sense of proportion to engage in the same behavior.  We 
hypothesized this competitive context will trigger children’s ability to attend to proportion and 
willingness to use proportion to judge the friendliness.  
The goal of study was to explore the presence of disadvantageous inequity aversion in 
children. Our study consisted of two cartoon characters, each with a designated amount of chips. 
Each cartoon character gave a certain proportion of chips to the child, and a proportion to a 
competitor, a toy monkey. The proportion of chips given to the child and the toy monkey varied 
between trials. In each trial, the child either received a higher proportion, a lower proportion, or 
an equal proportion relative to a competitor. If the child recognized that he or she received a 
disadvantageous share of chips compared to the monkey, then it presumably impacted how he or 
she views this stranger as a possible “friend”. In order to compare the amount of chips the child 
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received in relation to the monkey, the child must use his or her perception of proportion. Thus, 
we anticipated that a child’s motivation to measure how “friend-worthy” each cartoon character 
is will encourage him or her to use an innate ability to attend to proportion and ratio.  We 
hypothesized that the higher the proportion given to the rival, the less likely both four and five-
year-old children would be inclined to choose that character as a potential friend. 
Methods 
Participants 
31 four and five-year-old children (18 females, 13 males) were recruited via invitations 
sent to parents from a database of birth records in the New York City area. 17 four-year-olds 
(range = 4 years 0 months to 4 years 11 months) and 15 five-year-olds (range = 5 years 0 
months to 5 years 11 months) were run. In addition, participants were recruited from day cares, 
schools, and community groups in the metropolitan area. Adults were 14 undergraduate students 
(6 females, 8 males) recruited from a large, private university in New York City, and were 
reimbursed $5 upon completion of the study.  
Child Procedure 
 Each participant was brought into a designated quiet room in the research center or in a 
pre-school, where the study was videotaped. The experimenter would introduce the child to a toy 
stuffed monkey named “Mr. Monkey” and placed the monkey next to the child. The children 
were then told that they were going to meet some new people – and each person had chips that 
they wanted to give to both the child and the monkey. The children were told that the chips could 
be used later to get toys, and that they would be competing with Mr. Monkey for the chips. It is 
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important to note that children were not told of an exact amount of chips needed to be obtained 
in order to get a toy. At the beginning of each trial (among a total of ten trials), the experimenter 
introduced the child to two pictures of cartoon characters. The experimenter presented the 
amount of chips each cartoon had by saying, “This is (character name), he/she has this many 
chips!” The experimenter would then say, “(Character name) wants you to have this many chips, 
and he/she wants Mr. Monkey to have this many chips,” At the same time, the experimenter slid 
the designated amount of chips to the child and the toy monkey. This was repeated with the 
second cartoon character. At the end of each trial, all the chips both characters had were all 
distributed to the child and the toy monkey. No chips were left. The child was then asked, “Who 
do you want to be friends with?” The cartoon the child explicitly points at or the cartoon name 
the child explicitly said was our dependent measure. Once the child made his or her selection, the 
child was asked to collect the chips and keep it in a designated cup until the end of the study. The 
experimenter collected the monkey’s chips and began the next trial (see Figure 1 for an example 
trial).  
 Children were run in two different conditions - designated as (3,x) and (4,x). Some 
children were run in only one condition (N = 4, N = 9 ), while some children were run in both 
conditions (N = 25, 14 females). Each condition contained 5 trials. The order of the conditions 
was counterbalanced across participants by gender and age. The two conditions contained the 
following trials. 
(1)  (3,x) Condition, in which both cartoons within each of the five trials gave 3 chips to the 
child. One cartoon, Cartoon A (the constant giver), within each trial gave the child 3 
chips, and the competitor 1 chip (this will be represented as (3,1)). The other cartoon, 
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Cartoon B (the variable giver), gave the child 3 chips as well, but a varying amount of 
chips to the toy monkey (the rival) within each trial. The amount of chips given to the 
rival varied between each trial in the amounts of 2, 3, 5, 7 and 9. These trials were 
represented by (3,2), (3,3), (3,5), (3,7), and (3,9). In this trial, the absolute amount of 
chips given to the child was kept the same, but the proportion given varied by the amount 
given to the competitor. For example, Cartoon A gave the usual steady proportion of 25% 
(1 of 4 chips) to the competitor, while Cartoon B could give either 40% (3 of 5 chips), 
50% (3 of 6 chips), 63% (5 of 8 chips), 70% (7 of 10), or 75% (9 of 12). 
(2) (4,x) Condition, in which one cartoon in each trial, Cartoon A (the constant giver), 
always gave the child 3 chips and the rival 1 chip (3,1). A second cartoon, Cartoon B (the 
variable giver) always gave the child 4 chips while varying the amount given to the 
monkey. The amounts were 1,2,4,6 and 8, represented in the form of (4,1), (4,2), (4,4), 
(4,6), and (4,8). In this condition, both the absolute amount and proportion of chips given 
to the child varied. Cartoon A gave the constant proportion of chips to the competitor 
(25%), while Cartoon B varied the proportion by giving either 20% of the chips (1 of 5 
chips), 33% (2 of 6 chips), 50% (4 of 8 chips), 60% (6 of 10 chips), or 67% (8 of 12 
chips) to the competitor. 
 The (3,x) condition was implemented to see if children could attend to proportion when 
absolute amount was equal (thus, the children could not use absolute amount as a basis for a 
judgment of friend-worthiness). Likewise, the (4,x) condition was used to explore whether  
children could attend to proportion despite the fact that one character gave the child more chips 
in terms of absolute amount. The varying proportion of chips given to the rival between trials 
was to explore whether or not there was a linear progression towards preferring the (3,1) cartoon 
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as the proportion of chips given to the rival increased. We also hypothesized a large shift in 
preferring the (3,1) constant character as a friend as soon as the other character begins to give a 
rival a higher proportion of chips (more than 25%). This expectation is shown in Figure 2.  
The pair of cartoons in each individual trial looked identical with the exception of clothes 
color, eye color, and hair color. In addition, each of the trials began with a distinct pair of 
cartoons, as if the child was meeting two “strangers” upon every trial. The use of these characters 
was counterbalanced, in addition to the order of the conditions run, gender of the cartoons, the 
side each cartoon was presented on, and the trial order. Within each trial, one cartoon had white 
chips and one cartoon had black chips. This was to prevent any confusion during the allocation 
of chips. These neutral colored chips were chosen to mitigate the effects of color preference. 
Adult Procedure 
In addition to this procedure, a parallel study was run with adults (N = 14, 6 female). The 
adult parallel was a pen a paper task. All chip amounts and proportion given to the participant 
and the rival were kept the same.  
Results 
Overall Data 
 A chi-square goodness-of- fit test, corrected for multiple comparisons, was used to 
determine if children’s distribution of friend selection differed from chance. For the (3,x) 
condition, children consistently chose the (3,1) cartoon as friend-worthy over the (3,5) cartoon 
(2(2, N = 26) = 7.54, p = .006). For all other trials, 4 and 5-year olds chose the (3,1) cartoon at 
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chance as more friend-worthy over the other cartoons (p > .01). For the (4,x) condition, children 
chose their friends at chance for every trial. Because there were no significant patterns or trends 
found in both conditions, the data were collapsed across the (3,x) and (4,x) conditions. These 
data are summarized in Figure 3. Additionally, the trials were represented as the percentage of 
chips given to the rival. The trial percentages are as follows: (4,1) = 20% of chips given to the 
rival,  (4,2) = 33%, (3,2) = 40%, (3,3) and (4,4) = 50%, (4,6) = 60%, (3,5) = 63%, (4,8) = 66%, 
(3,7) = 70%, and (3,9) = 75%. The (3,1) constant in all conditions involves giving 25% of the 
chips to the rival, and 75% of the chips to the rival.  
Gender 
 There were few obvious trends or differences in performance found between boys and 
girls. Girls chose the (3,1) cartoon at a significantly higher rate than boys in the (3,1) versus (4,2) 
trial, in which the rival received 33% of the chip allocations (p = .002). No other significant 
findings were present. The data are summarized in Figure 4. 
Age 
 Again, there were few obvious trends and differences in friend choice found between 
four-year-olds and five-year-olds. Four-year-olds chose the (3,1) cartoon over the (3,5) to be 
friends at a significant rate (p = .007), while five-year-olds did not. Five-year-olds chose the 
(3,1) character over the (3,2) character, in which the rival received 40% of the resources, at a 
significantly higher rate (p < .001). In addition, the same finding was found in the (3,1) versus 
(3,7) trial, in which 5-year-olds did not choose the cartoon character who gave 70% of their chips 
to the rival (p < .001).  The data are summarized in Figure 5.  
Siblings 
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 We divided the participant pool into two groups: participants with siblings and 
participants without. We thought that this factor could potentially affect the way children 
perceive not getting some resources and sharing. Children with siblings chose the (3,1) character 
as more friend-worthy over the (4,8) character (p = .01). Despite this finding, there were no 
visible patterns found between siblings and only children. The data are summarized in Figure 6.  
Adults 
  Adult performance in the parallel study differed greatly from that of children’s. Adults 
chose the constant giver at an almost significant rate for all trials where the variable giver gave 
the competitor a higher percentage than the constant giver (over 25%) (p < .03). For the trials 
where the percentage of chips given to the competitor was high (from 63% to 75%), the adults 
chose the constant giver at a very significant rate (p < .008). In the trial where the constant giver 
gave a higher percentage of chips to the rival compared to the variable giver (20% compared to 
25%), adults chose the constant giver at a very significant rate (p = .001).  This data were very 
similar to the hypothesized data for the four and five-year-old children. The data are summarized 
in Figure 7.  
Discussion 
In order to explore how children and adults used proportion to reason about soc ial traits, 
we had four to five-year-old children and adult participants choose with whom they wanted to be 
friends with after they were allocated resources from two strangers. Our first finding is that four 
and five-year-old children inconsistently chose their friends when we varied the proportion of 
resources given to the children and their rival. Secondly, we found that adults consistently used 
proportion when judging social traits such as friendliness. Adults chose the character who 
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allocated a higher proportion of chips to them as the character they wanted to be friends with. 
This solidifies previous evidence that adults largely use proportion to judge social traits 
(McCrink, et al., 2010). In addition, the finding provides evidence to our hypothesis that humans 
attend to proportion in competitive situations, and compare their pay-offs relative to other 
individuals. However, the data do not provide concrete evidence of young children’s inability to 
reason proportionally in an adult- like fashion. Instead, methodological limitations and future 
directions will be discussed.  
One limitation was that the study did not fully parallel the methodology used with non-
human primates (Brosnan & de Waal, 2003; Brosnan, 2006). For example, the capuchin 
monkeys and chimpanzees were trained to trade tokens in exchange for a reward. The effort 
made to receive the reward may have encouraged the capuchin monkeys and chimpanzees to 
attend more to the reward received by conspecifics. In fact, it was found that capuchin monkeys 
attended to the effort made by other monkeys to deserve the received reward (Brosnan, 2006). 
Thus, future studies should have a participant perform a fairly difficult task that they believe is 
worthy of resource allocation. A rival that receives the same resource allocation for no effort 
could possibly make the participant more averse to inequality.  The concept of effort may play a 
large role in whether or not the child feels entitled to the resource allocation in the first place. 
The child may be accepting of all resource allocations, as he or she has done little to deserve the 
allocation in the first place. In fact, one child proclaimed during the study, “But I did nothing to 
get these chips!” 
In addition, the rewards allocated to the capuchin monkeys and chimpanzees varied on a 
qualitative level. The presence of inequality aversion in non-human primates has only been 
found when the subject received one cucumber and a conspecific received one grape. Thus the 
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absolute amount of reward given to both subjects was the same, but the quality was different. 
Another future study that could be implemented is to give a rival a more attractive reward (such 
as candy or a toy) and the participant an unattractive reward (such as a rock). This method would 
test if inequality aversion is present in children in the same way it is present in non-human 
primates. If so, further studies could test participants’ sensitivity to proportion by manipulating 
the quantity and quality of the reward given to the participant and the rival. 
Another question to ask ourselves is, “What is the meaning of friendship to children?” 
Research has shown that children tie the fairness of resource allocations to friendship often 
(Olson & Spelke, 2008). For example, it was found that children favored towards an equal 
distribution when there were enough resources – but greatly favored family, friends, or strangers 
that they perceived as “giving” when resources were limited (Olson & Spelke, 2008). In our 
study, each resource-allocating character had more than enough resources for both the participant 
and the rival.  Because there were enough resources, the participants may favor equal 
distributions in addition to attending to inequality. Perhaps in their eyes, choosing a friend meant 
someone that gave equally in this situation of excess resources. However, they may not want 
their rival to receive a more attractive reward. This tension between these two concepts may have 
led to the inconsistent data found with four and five-year-old children. A future methodological 
change could involve limiting the number of resources available to the child and the rival.  
Olson & Spelke (2008) also found that children, despite limited social experience, have a 
preference for those who share resources with them and others as well. Perhaps a child’s 
preference for those that have provided resources to others in the past is directly linked with how 
they perceive this character as friend-worthy. When choosing who to be friends with, one may 
think about how these particular characters would act in the future.  Choosing a character who 
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has shared with both the child and the rival may mean a higher chance of receiving resources at a 
later time. Thus, it is suggested that future studies do not ask children with whom they want to be 
friends with, but instead enact a less subjective dependent measure. Linked with this notion of 
friendship and the future, children may also have had a preference for the “richer” characters. 
McCrink, et al.’s (2010) study found that children had a baseline preference for rich individuals. 
Children may feel inclined to choose characters that, as a whole, have more resources than the 
other. Despite the fact that this particular character may choose to give a higher proportion of 
their resources to a rival, the child may choose to be friends with the richer character in hopes 
that they will receive more resources at some time in the future. Instead it is suggested that both 
characters within each trial have the same amount of chips, but given a different proportion of 
each amount to the child and the rival.  
There is the possibility that children are attuned to proportion and averse to inequality, 
but cannot fully verbalize their unhappiness yet. A recent study has shown that even three-year-
old children are unhappy with disadvantageous resource allocations, but do not explicitly say so 
(LoBue, et al., 2011).  LoBue and colleagues discuss how asking for explicit verbal responses 
and judgments after resource allocations underestimates children’s knowledge. Instead, 
behavioral and emotional signals in children during moments of unequal resource distribution 
were looked at. A child and a classmate were allocated stickers from the researcher. Each child 
was asked if the allocation was acceptable. While three-year-old and four-year-old children 
verbally rarely objected to the inequality, their emotional behavior coded by neutral coders 
showed that they were upset by the inequality. This finding implied that young children are well 
aware of inequality and fairness, but may be confused or unknowing when it comes to 
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responding to such inequality. Thus, there is a possibility that the children who participated in 
this study were not able to explicitly verbalize their preferences for what character.  
Lastly, there is the methodological limitation of whether the child participants were in a 
situation where their inequality aversion would arise. Although the children were told that the 
cartoon characters could all be potential friends, their attention and investment in the situation 
may vary from that of a real- life situation. The child participant’s competitor for resources, Mr. 
Monkey, may not be a worthy competitor for some children. Previous studies have discussed the 
possibility of a child not revealing his or her true aversion to inequality or attention to fairness 
unless competing with an equal, such as a classmate (LoBue, et al., 2011). Future studies should 
have children compete with another child of the same age and gender for resources. 
In conclusion, our findings on children’s proportional reasoning during social situations 
are inconclusive. However, these data do not provide concrete proof that four and five-year-old 
children cannot use proportion in the same way adults do when judging fairness and friend-
worthiness. Steps should be taken to acknowledge and adjust the many methodological 
limitations with this study in order to properly explore what children are actually thinking during 
and after resource allocations.  
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Figure 1. An example of a trial in the study. Firstly, the child is introduced to one cartoon 
character and the amount of chips he or she has. Secondly, a certain proportion of chips are 
allocated to the child and the rival. Next, the second character was introduced and his or her 
chips were allocated to the child and the rival.  
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Figure 2. Predicted outcome of the percentage of children who choose the constant giver 
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Figure 3. Percentage of children who chose the constant giver compared to the percentage given 
to the rival, shown with the (3,x) and (4,x) condition collapsed.  
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Figure 4. Percentage of girls and boys who chose the constant giver compared to the percentage 
given to the rival, shown with the (3,x) and (4,x) condition collapsed.  
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Figure 5. Percentage of four and five-year-old children who chose the constant giver compared 
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Figure 6. Percentage of children with siblings and only children who chose the constant giver 
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Figure 7. Percentage of adults who chose the constant giver compared to the percentage given to 
the rival, shown with the (3,x) and (4,x) condition collapsed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
